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Abstract Safety culture is broadly recognized as important for operational safety in
various fields, including air traffic management, power plant control and health care.
Previous studies addressed characterization and assessment of safety culture exten-
sively. Nevertheless, relations between safety culture and formal and informal orga-
nizational structures and processes are yet not well understood. To address this gap,
a new, formal, agent-based approach is proposed. This paper shows the application
of the approach to an air navigation service provider, including structured modeling,
analysis and identification of improvement strategies for the organizational safety
culture. The model results have been validated using safety culture data that had been
achieved by an independent safety culture survey study.
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1 Introduction
Organizational and safety culture are broadly recognized as important for operational
safety in various fields, including air traffic management, power plant control and
health care. For example, as indicated in Leveson et al. (2005), investigations into
many NASA mission failures pointed to cultural problems and the need for cultural
and organizational improvements. Currently, as a prelude to systemic changes in air
traffic management via innovation programmes SESAR in Europe and NextGen in
the USA, more and more Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP’s) go through
safety culture measurement and improvement processes.
The main aspects of organizational culture are reflected in a definition by Uttal
(1983): ‘Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that inter-
act with an organization’s structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms
(the way we do things around here).’ There exists a variety of definitions of safety
culture. Most of them encompass five components: (1) informed culture that collates
data from accidents and incidents and combines them with information from proac-
tive measures (e.g., safety audits); (2) reporting culture in which employees feel free
to report safety-related occurrences; (3) just culture characterized by an atmosphere
of trust; (4) flexible culture that successfully manages safety during organizational
changes; (5) learning culture needed to draw conclusions from the information col-
lected along with the will to implement necessary changes. The term safety culture is
used in this paper as those aspects of organizational culture that may have an effect
on safety, in line with reasoning of Hopkins (2006).
Various studies focused on characterization of safety culture and on assessment of
safety culture of various organizations, including ANSPs (cf. Ek et al. 2007). How-
ever, the links of safety culture with organizational structures and processes are yet
not well understood and this affects the determination of ways to improve safety cul-
ture. Traditional approaches to safety analysis (Bedford and Cooke 2001) focus on
failure events and human errors and put events into chains or trees, which are used
for sequential cause-effect reasoning for accident causation. However, such trees do
not account for complex, non-linear dependencies and dynamics inherent in ANSPs
and, therefore, are not well suited for safety culture analysis. More promising ap-
proaches for modeling and analysis of safety culture using system dynamics were
proposed in Leveson et al. (2005) and in Mohaghegh and Mosleh (2009). These ap-
proaches abstract from single events and actors and take an aggregate view on the
organizational dynamics. Consequently, in safety culture models aggregated values
are assigned to such highly individual variables as ‘fear of reporting’, ‘employee par-
ticipation’, ‘perceived risk’. By taking such an aggregated view, important effects of
individual differences on local interaction and global organizational dynamics may
be overlooked.
A number of agent-based approaches for control, coordination, optimization and
safety assessment of operations in air traffic have been proposed in the area of multi-
agent systems. In particular in Tumer and Agogino (2007) a distributed agent-based
air traffic flow management system is described. Through reinforcement learning
this system ensures observance of separation safety norms by aircraft in a simulated
airspace. Another agent-based system described in Wolfe (2007) is used to support
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air traffic controllers in their decision making in air traffic control tasks. In Lee et
al. (2005) a cognitive agent model for an air traffic controller is proposed, used for
analysis of different working modes through simulation. In Blom et al. (2006) sto-
chastic dynamic agent-based models are used to describe the performance of people
and systems in air traffic scenarios, addressing their performance in both nominal and
off-nominal situations. Monte Carlo simulations of these models provide rare event
probability estimates of safety-critical scenarios, including the accident risk of air
traffic operations.
However, above agent-based approaches do not address the organizational layer
and interaction between a formal organization and autonomous behavior of organi-
zational agents explicitly. Furthermore, these systems do not focus on organizational
and safety culture modeling and analysis.
Influences of national culture and some aspects of the organizational culture on
project team performance were investigated in Horii et al. (2004). The authors also
provide an extensive model of the organizational context based on the Virtual Design
Team framework Kunz et al. (1998) in this study. Safety aspects are mentioned only
briefly in this study and influence of aspects of national culture on safety culture is
not considered.
An agent-based approach proposed in this paper focuses on modeling and analysis
of safety culture in particular and addresses an existing gap between safety culture
and organizational structures and processes. It provides a formal basis for under-
standing the causal relations between organizational processes that influence safety
culture, such that robust and flexible policies may be identified to improve and main-
tain a sufficient level of safety culture in an organization.
This paper demonstrates the application of the approach to an air navigation ser-
vice provider, including structured modeling, analysis and identification of improve-
ment strategies for the organizational safety culture. The development of the orga-
nizational model has been focused on safety occurrence reporting at a real ANSP
(called ANSP3 throughout the paper) using an existing formal organization model-
ing framework (Sharpanskykh 2008) and data provided by ANSP3. The reporting of
safety-related occurrences is obligatory in Air Traffic Management (ATM) and it is
an important constituent of the Safety Management System (SMS) of ANSPs. It is
recognized that there is a strong reciprocal relation between the organizational safety
culture and the reporting behavior of air traffic controllers (Ek et al. 2007). In the
model proposed this relation is elaborated formally, in detail.
As a basis for the validation, results of a safety culture survey questionnaire for
ANSP3 and of the related workshops administered by EUROCONTROL were used.
This safety culture survey approach has been applied at a large number of ANSPs
in Europe. The survey questionnaire data obtained in these applications were ana-
lyzed statistically to ensure that the questions appropriately address the key aspects
of safety culture (EUROCONTROL/FAA AP15 2008).
Thus, the main contributions of the paper are:
(1) A formal, agent-based organizational model for ANSP3 developed by a struc-
tured methodology; the model addresses both prescriptive aspects of the formal
organization and autonomous behavior of agents.
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(2) Identification of explicit, formal relations between safety culture indicators and
the agent-based organizational model.
(3) Analysis methods for structured identification of safety culture issues and safety
culture improvement options.
(4) Validation of the obtained model results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 a case study is introduced. An overview
of the modeling approach is provided in Sect. 3. Modeling of the formal organization
from the case study is described in Sect. 4. Modeling of agent-specific aspects for the
case study is described in Sect. 5. Furthermore, it is described in Sect. 5 how safety
culture indicators identified in the paper can be related to the model. The developed
method for safety culture analysis is presented in Sect. 6. Also model validation is
considered in Sect. 6. Finally, Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
2 Case study
In operations performed by air traffic controllers hazardous situations may occur,
e.g., separation minima infringement, runway incursion, aircraft deviation from ATC
clearance. According to air traffic safety regulations, controllers are obliged to re-
port safety occurrences of a large number of predefined types. In particular, infor-
mation about safety occurrences is useful for safety analysis (e.g., identification of
safety trends). Some ANSPs reprimand controllers for occurrences. Sometimes also
rewards are provided for reporting occurrences. Although reporting is obligatory, it
is believed that not all identified occurrences are properly reported by controllers. To
understand the reasons for such behavior, the occurrence reporting cycle including
the controller’s decision making whether to report an occurrence is modeled in this
study in the context of an existing ANSP.
Controllers work in shifts, within each shift a pair of controllers is allocated to
each air traffic control sector. A controller supervisor manages work in a shift. Af-
ter a controller decides to report an observed occurrence, s/he creates a notification
report. The draft report is reviewed and maybe corrected by the supervisor and it is
provided to the Safety Investigation Unit of the ANSP. Depending on the occurrence
severity and the collected information about (similar) occurrences, the Safety Inves-
tigation Unit makes the decision whether to initiate a detailed investigation. During
the investigation accumulated organizational knowledge and data about safety related
issues (in particular, learned from notification reports) is used. As the investigation
result, a final occurrence assessment report is produced, which should be provided to
the controller-reporter as a feedback. Furthermore, often final reports contain recom-
mendations for safety improvement, which are required to be implemented by ANSP
(e.g., provision of training, improvement of formal procedures, extension of staff).
3 Modeling approach: overview
In this section an overview of the agent-based modeling approach is provided. First,
modeling requirements are discussed in Sect. 3.1. Then, the organization modeling
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framework used is considered in Sect. 3.2. After that, the formal modeling language
used for the model specification is described briefly in Sect. 3.3.
3.1 Modeling requirements
To identify safety culture aspects relevant for the safety occurrence reporting, safety
culture survey results of two ANSPs (different from ANSP3) and safety culture data
from the literature were analyzed and interviews were conducted with experts at EU-
ROCONTROL Head Quarters and at ANSP3. As result of this analysis, a categorized
set of safety culture issues that impact safety occurrence reporting was determined;
some examples are given in Table 1 and a full list is specified in (supplementary
material).
For each issue from the set, required organization modeling aspects have been
identified. For example, for S1.9 the following modeling aspects were identified:
‘Cognitive and psychological characteristics’, ‘Generation of beliefs on safety-related
information’, ‘Influence of psychological, cognitive and other individual character-
istics on (the attitude towards) reporting’; for S2.3: ‘Trust to a peer’, ‘Team com-
position’, ‘Collaboration in a team and its influence on safety’. Based on the three
criteria—importance for modeling of safety occurrence reporting, availability of data,
maturity level of modeling techniques—the selection of the most relevant modeling
aspects has been performed for further inclusion in the model. More details on iden-
tification of safety culture issues and modeling aspects are given in (supplementary
material).
Furthermore, based on the identified set of safety culture issues, eight safety cul-
ture indicators were identified. These indicators were used in our study for the evalu-
ation of the quality of the ANSP’s safety culture in relation to occurrence reporting.
Table 1 Examples of the identified safety culture issues
Group 1: Individual aspects
S1.1: Occurrence reporting may lead to ‘naming and blaming’ and therefore it may not be in the
personal interest of an actor
S1.9: The confidentiality of reporting is not trusted
S1.2: Actors are not motivated to report their safety concerns because of the lack of feedback and
interest experienced in the organization
Group 2: Team aspects
S2.3: Willingness of actors to cooperate with an actor may decrease after s/he has been involved in
a (serious) incident
S2.6: Problems are not raised as actors do not want to be seen as trouble-makers
S2.9: Supervisors may not effectively reinforce safety culture
Group 3: Intra-organizational aspects
S3.1: Importance of safety-related goals may be threatened by performance-related goals
S3.17: Feedback/lessons learned from incidents comes too late or not at all
S3.13: Information about changes in procedures and in the system is not provided on time to (some)
actors that require this information
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The values of these indicators are determined by simulation based on the ANSP3’s
model described in this paper. These values are used as input for the validation of the
approach proposed.
SCI1: Average reporting quality of controllers. It refers to the ratio of reported to
observed occurrences.
SCI2: Average quality of the processed notification reports. It refers to the correct-
ness and completeness of information about the reported occurrences.
SCI3: Average quality of the final safety occurrence assessment reports. It refers to
the completeness of the occurrence report with respect to the causes of the occur-
rence.
SCI4: Average quality of the monthly safety overview reports received by con-
trollers. It refers to the completeness of the report with respect to the safety trends.
SCI5.1: Average commitment to safety of controllers.
SCI5.2: Average commitment to safety of a team as perceived by controllers.
SCI6: Average commitment to safety of a supervisor as perceived by controllers.
SCI7: Average commitment to safety of management as perceived by controllers.
The range of each indicator is [0,1].
3.2 Organization modeling framework
For modeling safety occurrence reporting in ANSP3 the organization modeling
framework from Sharpanskykh (2008) was used. In this framework organizations are
considered from different perspectives (views). Process-oriented view describes the
workflow as well as static structures of tasks and resources. Performance-oriented
view is characterized by a goal structure, a performance indicators structure, and re-
lations between them as well as relations between goals and tasks, performance in-
dicators and processes, goals and roles or agents. Organization-oriented view defines
the organizational roles, each associated with a set of tasks and characterized by au-
thority and responsibility relations on tasks, resources and information. Commitment,
obligation and power relations and sets of competences required for agent allocation
to roles are also defined. Agent-oriented view identifies different types of agents with
their capabilities and behavior.
Furthermore, this framework describes a sequence of organization design steps,
an overview of which is provided in Table 2. This framework includes all the mod-
eling aspects related to the formal organization of ANSP3, which were identified as
required to be included in the model. Modeling of the formal organization from the
case study is described in Sect. 4. The framework does not prescribe any specific ar-
chitecture or approach for modeling of agents. Modeling of agent-specific aspects for
the case study considered in the paper is described in Sect. 5.
3.3 Formal modeling language
To specify organizational dynamic properties, the order-sorted predicate logic-based
language called LEADSTO is used (Bosse et al. 2007). Dynamics in LEADSTO is
represented as evolution of states over time. A state is characterised by a set of prop-
erties that do or do not hold at a certain point in time. To specify state properties for
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Table 2 Overview of steps in organizational modeling and their relation with the views considered
Design step View
Organization Performance Process Agent
Identification of organizational roles x
Identification of interactions between roles and with
the environment
x
Identification of requirements for roles x x
Identification of organizational performance indica-
tors and goals
x
Identification of resources x
Identification of organizational tasks and relations be-
tween tasks, resources and goals
x x
Identification of authority relations x x
Identification of workflows x
Identification of characteristics (skills, psychological
and cognitive characteristics) of agents
x x
Identification of goals and needs of agents x
Identification of commitments, obligations and re-
sponsibilities of agents
x
Identification of attitudes and beliefs of agents x
Identification of relations between agents (e.g., inter-
action, trust and informal power relations) and infor-
mal structures of agents
x x
Identification of shared beliefs, attitudes, norms and
values of (groups of) agents
x
Identification of performance variability in formal and
informal flows of control
x x
Allocation principles of agents to organizational roles x
Identification of organizational constraints x x x x
Specification of the environmental dynamics x
components of an organization, ontologies are used which are defined by a number
of sorts, sorted constants, variables, functions and predicates (i.e., a signature or a
vocabulary). For every component A a number of ontologies can be distinguished:
the ontologies IntOnt(A), InOnt(A), OutOnt(A), and ExtOnt(A) are used to express re-
spectively internal, input, output and external state properties of the component A.
Input ontologies contain elements for describing perceptions of a component (e.g.,
organizational actor) from the external world.
In particular, to specify observation requests of components in the environment,
function to_be_observed: STATE_PROPERTY → STATPROP is used. Observation
results are provided to the component’s input using the function observation_result:
STATE_PROPERTY → STATPROP, which indicates whether the state property holds
in the environment. For example, observation_result(occurrence(o, ot)) specifies the
observation of occurrence o of type ot.
Output ontologies describe actions and communications of components. To spec-
ify communications the following function is included in the output ontologies:
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communicated_from_to: COMPONENT × COMPONENT × MSG_TYPE × CON-
TENT → STATPROP
Here the first argument denotes the component-source of information, the
second—the component-recipient of information, the third argument denotes the
types of the communication (which may be one of the following {observe, inform,
request, decision, feedback}) and the fourth—the content of the communication. The
sort COMPONENT is a composite sort that comprises all subsorts of the components
of particular types (e.g., CONTROLLER). The sort CONTENT is also the composite
sort that comprises all names of terms that are used as the communication content.
Such terms are constructed from sorted constants, variables and functions in the stan-
dard predicate logic way.
For example, communicated_from_to(ag_controller, ag_supervisor, inform, no-
tification_report_for_B)) specifies communication of notification_report_for_B from
ag_controller to ag_supervisor.
Actions of a component generated at its input interface are formalized by func-
tion performed: ACTION → STATPROP. For example, performed(action(initiate_
reporting(o, ot))) specifies the action to initiate reporting about occurrence o of type
ot.
Internal ontologies describe internal states of components. The modelling lan-
guage allows specifying a large variety of cognitive architectures (Bosse et al. 2007).
For example, to specify beliefs, which form a part of many existing cognitive models,
function belief: STATPROP × TIME → STATPROP may be included in the internal
ontology of a component. Sort TIME contains a set of linearly ordered time points.
For example, belief(occurrence_A, 10) specifies the belief that occurrence_A was ob-
served at time point 10.
External ontologies are used to describe states of the environment. For example, to
specify safety occurrences in the environment function occurrence: OCCUR × OC-
CUR_TYPE can be used, where sort OCCUR contains all names of the occurrences,
OCCUR_TYPE contains all names of the occurrence types.
For a given ontology Ont, the propositional language signature consisting of all
state ground atoms based on Ont is denoted by APROP(Ont). State properties are
specified based on such ontology by propositions that can be made (using con-
junction, negation, disjunction, implication) from the ground atoms. Then, a state
S is an indication of which atomic state properties are true and which are false:
S: APROP(Ont) → {true, false}.
LEADSTO enables modeling of direct temporal dependencies between two state
properties in successive states, also called dynamic properties. A specification of dy-
namic properties in LEADSTO is executable and can be depicted graphically. The
format is defined as follows. Let α and β be state properties of the form ‘conjunc-
tion of atoms or negations of atoms’, and e, f, g, h non-negative real numbers. In the
LEADSTO language the notation α e,f,g,h β means: if state property α holds for
a certain time interval with duration g, then after some delay (between e and f) state
property β will hold for a certain time interval of length h (see Fig. 1).
When e = f = 0 and g = h = 1, called standard time parameters, we write α  β .
LEADSTO specifications can be translated automatically to a general state transi-
tion system format as described in Sharpanskykh and Treur (2010). Such translated
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Fig. 1 The timing relationships
for a LEADSTO expression
specifications can be executed by a large variety of tools, including Matlab, MetateM
(Fisher 1996), and automata-based simulation environments.
Consider an example dynamic property for a controller agent:
observation_result(occurrence(o, ot))  performed(action(initiate_reporting(o, ot)))
Informally, this example expresses that if the agent observes occurrence o of type ot,
then after that the agent will initiate reporting of the occurrence during 1 time unit.
In addition, LEADSTO allows expressing mathematical operations. To this end
functional symbols −, +, /, • : VALUE × VALUE → VALUE are introduced, here
sort VALUE is an ordered set of numbers. In the model description in Sects. 4 and 5
for better readability mathematical expressions will be used instead of logical ones,
e.g. the rule has_value(x, v)  has_value(x, v*0.25) is specified by the mathematical
expression xt = xt−1*0.25.
4 Modeling formal organization
A model for the formal organization from the case study was built along the design
steps described in Sharpanskykh (2008).
4.1 The identification of the organizational roles
A role is a (sub-)set of functionalities of an organization, which are abstracted from
specific agents who fulfill them. Each role can be composed by several other roles,
until the necessary detailed level of aggregation is achieved. A role composed of
(interacting) subroles is called a composite role. A formal or informal organizational
group is modeled as a composite role. Grouping of roles in a composite role may be
done by knowledge and skill, by work process and function, by time, or by place.
At a higher abstraction level, sets of simple roles clustered in a composite role act
as a single entity interacting with other (composite) roles. Each role has an input
and an output interface, which facilitate interaction with other roles. Interfaces are
formalized using ontologies, defined by a number of sorts, sorted constants, variables,
functions and predicates (i.e., signatures). An input ontology specifies which types of
information can be provided to the input interface of a role, and an output ontology
determines which information types can be generated by a role. Furthermore, using
input/output interfaces information abstraction (or transformation) can be performed.
For example, a composite role may represent a department meeting at which the
progress of particular students is discussed. An output of this role to the composite
role representing Managerial Board may be the total number of students not making
satisfactory progress.
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Fig. 2 The interaction relations between the subroles of the role Air Navigation Service Provider at the
aggregation level 2
Fig. 3 The interaction relations between the subroles of the role Air Traffic Control Unit (a) and of the
role Safety Investigation Unit (b) at the aggregation level 3
The environment represents a special component of a model, which also has input
and output interfaces. In the case study roles are identified at three aggregation levels.
At the aggregation level 1 the Air Navigation Service Provider is considered as one
composite role. The subroles of the Air Navigation Service Provider are described at
the aggregation level 2 (see Fig. 2). Two ANSP’s roles are refined further, as shown
at aggregation level 3 in Fig. 3.
4.2 The specification of the interactions between the roles
Relations between roles are represented by interaction and interlevel links. An inter-
action link is an information channel between two roles at the same aggregation level.
An interlevel link connects a composite role with one of its subroles. The interaction
relations at the ANSP’s aggregation levels 2 and 3 are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
4.3 The identification of the requirements for the roles
In this step the requirements on knowledge, skills and personal traits of an agent im-
plementing a role are identified. A prerequisite for the allocation of an agent to a role
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is the existence of a mapping between the capabilities and traits of the agent and the
role requirements. For example, among the requirements for the controller role are:
passed a rigid medical examination; thorough knowledge of the flight regulations; air
traffic control training; excellent listening and communication skills; quick decision-
making skills. Note that the measure of the level of development may be associated
with some capabilities. For example, controllers may differ in the amount of hours
that they spent for air traffic control training.
4.4 The identification of the organizational performance indicators and goals
A performance indicator (PI) is a quantitative or qualitative indicator that reflects the
state/progress of the company, unit or individual. PIs can be hard (e.g., occurrence
investigation time) or soft, i.e., not directly measurable, qualitative (e.g., level of col-
laboration between controllers). Goals are objectives that describe a desired state or
development and are defined formally as expressions over PIs. The characteristics
of a goal include, among others: priority; horizon—for which time point/interval the
goal should be satisfied; hardness—hard or soft. A goal can be refined into subgoals
forming a hierarchy. For example, goal G18 ‘It is required to maintain timeliness and
a high quality of occurrence investigation’ is based on two PIs ‘timeliness of occur-
rence investigation’ and ‘quality of occurrence investigation’. This goal is refined in
several subgoals: G18.1 ‘It is required to maintain a high proficiency level of inci-
dent investigators’, G18.2 ‘It is required to maintain a sufficient level of details of
notification reports’, G18.3 ‘It is required to maintain the timely investigation of an
occurrence’ and G18.4 ‘It is required to maintain a high level of thoroughness of oc-
currence investigation’. Formally, is_refined_to(G18, L) & is_in_goal_list(G18.1, L) &
is_in_goal_list(G18.2, L) & is_in_goal_list(G18.3, L) & is_in_goal_list(G18.4, L). To
ensure the satisfaction of G18, the (sufficient degree of) satisfaction of its subroles
is required. Goals are related to roles. E.g., G18 is attributed to Safety Investigation
Unit role of the ANSP. Formally, is_committed_to(Safety Investigation Unit, G18).
4.5 The specification of the resources
Resource types are characterized by: name, category: discrete or continuous, mea-
surement unit, expiration duration: the time interval during which a resource type
can be used; location; sharing: some processes may share resources. Examples of
resource types are: aircraft, incident classification database, a notification report.
4.6 The identification of the tasks and relations between the tasks, the resources and
the goals
A task represents a function performed in the organization and is characterized by
name, maximal and minimal duration. Tasks can be decomposed into more specific
ones using AND- and OR-relations. Each task performed in an organization should
contribute to the satisfaction of one or more organizational goals. For example, task
T4 ‘Safety occurrence reporting and the report handling’ is refined into more specific
tasks, among which T4.1 ‘Create a notification report’, T4.3 ‘Making decision about
the investigation necessity’, T4.4 ‘Investigation of an occurrence’.
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Formally, is_decomposed_to(T4, L) & is_in_task_list(T4.1, L) & is_in_task_list
(T4.2, L) & is_in_task_list(T4.3, L) & is_in_task_list(T4.4, L). Task T4.4 is related
to resources as follows: it uses a notification report and produces a final oc-
currence assessment report. Formally, task_uses(T4.4, notification_report, 1) and
task_produces(T4.4, final_occurrence_assessment_report, 1). Furthermore, T4.1
contributes to goal G18.2, and T4.4 contributes to goals G18.3 and G18.4. For-
mally, is_realisable_by(G18.2, L) & is_in_list(T4.1, L) & is_realisable_by(G18.3, L1)
& is_in_list(T4.4, L1) & is_realisable_by(G18.4, L2) & is_in_list(T4.4, L2).
4.7 The specification of the authority relations
The following types of authority relations are distinguished: superior-subordinate re-
lations on roles with respect to tasks, responsibility relations, control for resources,
authorization relations. Roles may have different rights and responsibilities with
respect to different aspects of task execution, such as execution, passive moni-
toring, consulting, making technological and managerial decisions. For example,
Safety Investigator role is assigned responsible for execution of and making tech-
nological decisions with respect to task T4.4, Safety Manager is responsible for
monitoring, consulting and making managerial decisions related to T4.4. Formally,
is_authorized_for(Safety Investigator, execution, T4.4) & is_authorized_for(Safety In-
vestigator, tech_decisions, T4.4) & is_authorized_for(Safety Manager, monitoring,
T4.4) & is_authorized_for(Safety Manager, consulting, T4.4) & is_authorized_for
(Safety Manager, manag_decisions, T4.4).
4.8 The specification of the workflows
Workflows describe temporal ordering of processes of an organization in particular
scenarios. A workflow starts with the process BEGIN and ends with the process END;
both have zero duration. The (partial) order of execution of processes in the workflow
is defined by sequencing, branching, cycle and synchronization relations (referred
to as ordering relations) specified by the language from Popova and Sharpanskykh
(2008). A workflow that describes the execution of the safety occurrence reporting
and the report handling task is depicted in Fig. 4a.
This workflow is executed every time when an occurrence has been identified by
a controller. In the following the workflow is considered briefly. After a controller
decides to report an observed occurrence, she creates a notification report, which is
provided to the Safety Investigation Unit (SIU). Depending on the occurrence sever-
ity and the collected information about similar occurrences, Safety Investigator role
in SIU makes the decision whether to initiate a detailed investigation. During the
investigation, accumulated organizational data and knowledge about safety related
issues is used. As the investigation result, a final occurrence assessment report is pro-
duced, which provides feedback to the controller-reporter. Furthermore, often final
reports contain recommendations for safety improvement, which are advised to be
implemented by the ANSP.
A workflow for the safety monitoring task is depicted in Fig. 4b. This workflow is
executed continuously in a cycle, i.e., whenever the current instance of the workflow
finishes, a new instance of the workflow starts.
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4.9 The identification of the generic and domain-specific constraints
Generic constraints ensure internal consistency of an organizational specification.
Domain specific constraints restrain behavior of individuals in a particular organi-
zation. In particular, organizational reward policies can be formalized as domain-
specific constraints. For example, the reprimand policy for reporting can be formal-
ized by a set of constraints using a function repr that maps the number of occurrences
of some type to a reprimand value [0,1]: repr(1, A) = 1; repr(1, B) = 0.5.
5 Modeling agents
The specification of a formal organization forms a part of an overall organizational
description. Another part describes the characteristics and behavior of agents. In this
section first a theory of human behavior and cognition that forms a basis for agent
models is introduced in Sect. 5.1. The proposed agent architecture realizing the the-
ory is described in Sect. 5.2. Organizational learning based on learning of agents
is described in Sect. 5.3. Finally, it is demonstrated in Sect. 5.4 how cognitive and
behavioral states of the agents are related formally to safety culture indicators.
5.1 Theory of human behavior and cognition
In Cognitive Science the behavior of a human is often considered from the external
and internal perspectives (Kim 1996). From the external perspective, behavior of
the human can be described by correlations between input and output states over
time, without any reference to internal or mental properties of the human. Such a
view is considered within the philosophical perspective of behaviorism (Kim 1996).
A specification of externally observable behavior has the advantage that it can be
directly related to empirical information, however, it may have a high complexity.
From the internal perspective the behavior of the human can be characterized by a
specification of more direct (causal) temporal relations between mental states of the
human, based on which an externally observable behavioral pattern is generated. Such
a perspective is taken within the functionalist tradition (Kim 1996). The mental states
and their direct causal temporal relations can be used for simulation and analysis
of the human behavior, but they may well have a hypothetical status, as they are
difficult to observe. In this paper we consider both externally observable behavior
and internal cognitive processes of a human, which are related to each other in the
agent architecture described in Sect. 5.2.
The behavior of a human involves interaction with other humans and with the
environment. A human perceives information by observation and produces commu-
nication and actions. We distinguish passive and active observation processes. For
example, when some object is observable by a human and the human continuously
keeps track of its state, passive observation occurs. For passive observation, no initia-
tive of a human is needed. Active observation is always concerned with the human’s
initiative and a particular observation focus. To represent communication between
humans, speech act theory is used in this paper (Searle 1969). This theory allows rep-
resenting a wide diversity of illocutionary speech acts constituting communication.
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Based on psychological theories (e.g., Goldman 1967) it is postulated that a human
forms beliefs about observation and communication acts received. Besides beliefs
about single states, a human forms beliefs about dependencies between states. Beliefs
are used in human reasoning and decision making.
It is widely recognized in the literature (Pinder 1998) that the behavior and dynam-
ics of internal processes of a human are influenced by personal traits and capabilities.
In general, one can specify a great variety of personal traits (e.g., the big five model
Goldberg 1993). In particular, cultural traits are often recognized as influential for
the human behavior (Hofstede 2005). In the case study, cultural traits are specified
for each air traffic controller based on the cultural classification framework by Hof-
stede (2005). More specifically, the following indexes from the framework are used:
individualism (IDV) is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups;
power distance index (PDI) is the extent to which the less powerful members of an
organization accept and expect that power is distributed unequally; and uncertainty
avoidance index (UAI) deals with individual’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambigu-
ity. Human capabilities include knowledge and skills. Knowledge of a human is a set
of reasoning procedures, which are used in particular for execution of organizational
tasks. Human beliefs may be modified using knowledge. Skills describe developed
abilities of a human to use effectively and readily his or her knowledge for tasks
performance.
In social science behavior of individuals is considered as goal-driven (Robbins
2004; Pinder 1998; Locke 2001; van de Walle 1997). It is also recognized that indi-
vidual goals are based on needs (Pinder 1998). Different types of needs are distin-
guished: (1) extrinsic needs associated with biological comfort and material rewards;
(2) social interaction needs that refer to the desire for social approval and affilia-
tion, in particular own group approval and management approval; (3) intrinsic needs
that concern the desires for self-development and self-actualization, in particular con-
tribution to organizational safety-related goals and self-esteem, self-confidence and
self-actualization needs. Different needs have different priorities and minimal accept-
able satisfaction levels for individuals in different cultures.
According to the air traffic domain literature, commitment of air traffic controllers
to safety has a significant impact on the controllers’ safety-related behavior (Ek et al.
2007). In Griffin and Bateman (1986) two important aspects of organizational com-
mitment of a human are distinguished: (a) belief and acceptance of the values and
goals of the organization (safety-related goals in particular); (b) willingness to exert
effort on behalf of the organization, which is an element of the human’s maturity
w.r.t. to organizational tasks. The acceptance of the organizational goals is influenced
by the maturity degree with respect to organizational tasks (Hersey et al. 2001). Thus,
the priority of safety-related goals in the role description and the maturity level with
respect to ATC tasks are the primary constituents of the organizational commitment
of air traffic controllers in the case study considered. According to Griffin and Bate-
man (1986) the commitment increases when an agent has influence on decisions re-
lated to the object of commitment. Furthermore, also the environment (own team,
management) influences commitment (Burt 1987). The more cohesive the group, the
more influence it has on the human. Similarly, the more control and monitoring the
management exerts, the higher its influence on the human.
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In the theory of situational leadership (Hersey et al. 2001) the human’s maturity
w.r.t. to a task is defined as an aggregate of the human’s experience, willingness and
ability to take responsibility for the task. The human’s willingness to perform a task
is determined by the human’s confidence and commitment, which are necessary for
the task execution. The ability of a human to perform a task is determined by his
or her capabilities and the adequacy of the mental models for the task. In particular,
in accordance with Endsley and Garland (2000) the adequacy of the mental models
for the air traffic control tasks depends on the sufficiency and timeliness of training
provided to the controller and the adequacy of knowledge about safety-related issues.
Based on the domain knowledge we assume that such information is contained in
reports that resulted from safety-related activities: final occurrence assessment reports
that are based on occurrence investigations and monthly safety overview reports. The
maturity value changes over time as a result of gaining new knowledge and skills,
and changing self-confidence of a human.
Rational behavior of a human is determined by the human’s decision making, in
which all internal states and characteristics discussed previously (i.e., traits, capa-
bilities, beliefs, goals, needs, commitment, maturity) are involved (Janis and Mann
1977). In this paper a refined version of the expectancy theory by Vroom (Pinder
1998) has been used to model decision making of a human. Advantages of the ex-
pectancy theory include: (a) it can be formalized; (b) it allows incorporating the or-
ganizational context; (c) it has received good empirical support. According to this
theory, when a human evaluates alternative possibilities to act, he or she explicitly
or implicitly makes estimations for the following factors: valence, expectancy and
instrumentality (see Fig. 5).
Expectancy refers to the individual’s belief about the likelihood that a particular
act will be followed by a particular outcome (called a first-level outcome). Its value
varies between 0 and 1. Instrumentality is a belief concerning the likelihood of a
first level outcome resulting into a particular second level outcome; its value varies
between −1 and +1. Instrumentality takes negative values when a second-level out-
come has a negative correlation with a first-level outcome. A second level outcome
represents a desired (or avoided) state of affairs that is reflected in the agent’s needs.
In the proposed approach the original expectancy model is refined by considering
specific types of individual needs described above. Valence refers to the strength of
the individual’s desire for an outcome or state of affairs; it is also an indication of the
Fig. 5 An example of the
expectancy model by Vroom
(Pinder 1998); here E’s denote
expectancies, I ’s denote
instrumentalities and V ’s denote
valences
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priority of needs. Values of expectancies, instrumentalities and valences change over
time, in particular due to individual and organizational learning.
In the Vroom’s model the force on an individual to perform an act is defined as:
Fi =
n∑
j=1
E{i, j} ·
m∑
k=1
V {k} × I {i, j, k} (1)
Here E{I, j} is the strength of the expectancy that act A{i} will be followed by out-
come j ; V {k} is the valence of the second level outcome k; I {i, j, k} is perceived
instrumentality of outcome j for the attainment of outcome k for act i. The action
alternative with the highest force is chosen to be performed by the human.
A human has the ability to learn and adapt. In general, learning of a human has
many aspects and facets. In this paper by learning a change of human’s skills and/or
knowledge is understood. No assumption about the necessity of a performance im-
provement due to learning is made. In particular, forgetting is also seen as a special
kind of learning. Humans in organizations vary in the abilities and desires to learn.
In particular, the human’s learning behavior depends on the agent’s traits and needs.
Some traits mediate the attainment of skills. For example, extroversion and agreeable-
ness are important for building interpersonal skills. High priority human’s needs that
cannot be satisfied due to skill and/or knowledge limitations result into generation of
goals to learn the required capabilities.
Two types of individual learning are identified by Meinolf et al. (2001) as partic-
ularly relevant in an organizational context: instrumentalist and social learning. By
instrumentalist learning a human is able to form beliefs about dependencies between
his or her own states, observed states of the environment, and observed states of other
humans (such as expectancies and instrumentalities).
The second individual learning type—social learning—occurs by observation of
and communication with other humans. Communication may be formal (i.e., as pre-
scribed by a formal interaction specification in Sect. 4) and informal. To model infor-
mal communication of agents, the Burt’s social contagion theory has been used (Burt
1987). According to this theory, the intensity of informal communication between
agents is dependent directly on: (1) similarity of the formal communication patterns
of the agents’ roles; (2) equality of the formal power statuses of the agents in the
organization; (3) physical possibilities to communicate; (4) degree of acquaintance
of the agents with each other. For a shift of controllers the factors (1)–(3) have a high
degree of evidence, whereas the factor (4) depends on the shift composition (stable
versus variable).
5.2 Agent architecture
The proposed agent architecture is a particular refinement and instantiation of the
component-based Generic Agent Model (Brazier et al. 2000) (see Fig. 6). In the
Generic Agent Model agents are represented by autonomous components interacting
with the environment and other agents by sending and receiving information through
input and output interfaces. Agents perceive information by observation and generate
output in the form of communication or actions. Since agents can play organizational
roles, interaction among them is specified using the interaction ontologies of roles.
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Fig. 6 Component-based Agent architecture
In contrast to roles agents have internal states. The internal dynamics of an agent
is realized in the architecture proposed by the components described in the follow-
ing: The component World Interaction Management (WIM) takes care of interac-
tion with the world, the component Agent Interaction Management (AIM) takes care
of communication with other agents. The component Maintenance of World Infor-
mation (MWI) maintains beliefs about the world, and the component Maintenance
of Agent Information (MAI) maintains beliefs about other agents. The component
Own Process Control (OPC) coordinates the internal agent processes. The compo-
nent Agent Specific Task in the original Generic Agent Model is specialized into the
Cognitive Processing component which consists of the Cognitive State Determina-
tion (CSD) component and the Decision Making component (DM). The functionality
of the components is specified by direct causal relations between internal and interac-
tion states of the agent.The specification of the components described in the following
sections relies heavily on the concepts, relations and mechanisms from the theory of
human behavior and cognition described previously in Sect. 5.1.
5.2.1 World and agent interaction management
WIM and AIM components create beliefs about agent’s input and output states, which
are stored in MWI and MAI components respectively. A belief generation rule for an
observation of an agent a is specified as follows:
∀p:STATE_PROPERTY observation_result(p) & current_time(t)  belief(p, t)
Information about observed safety occurrences is stored by agents as beliefs: e.g., be-
lief(observed_occurrence_with(ot: OCCURRENCE_TYPE, ag:AGENT)), t:TIME). An
agent forms also beliefs about dependencies between its own states, observed states
of the environment, and observed states of other agents:
belief(occurs_after(p1:STATE_PROPERTY, p2:STATE_PROPERTY, t1:TIME,
t2:TIME), t:TIME),
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which expresses that state property p2 holds t’ (t1 < t’ t2) time points after p1
holds.
Such beliefs are created based on individual and organizational learning; mecha-
nisms for generation of such beliefs are considered in Sect. 5.3.
In the considered case, each controller agent creates the belief about the depen-
dency between providing a notification report on an occurrence of some type to
his/her supervisor and receiving a final assessment report on the occurrence (i.e.,
feedback) from a safety investigator agent. Moreover, often final assessment reports
include recommendations for organizational and environmental improvement, which
may be observed by the controller-reporter when implemented. These dependencies
are formalized as:
belief(occurs_after(output(ag_controller,
communicated_from_to(ag_controller, ag_supervisor, inform,
notification_report_for_B)),
output(ag_investigator,communicated_from_to(ag_investigator, ag_controller, inform,
final_assessment_ report_for_B))), 24h, 1440h)
belief(occurs_after(output(ag_investigator, communicated_from_to(ag_investigator,
ag_controller, inform, final_assessment_report_for_B)),
output(env, observation_result(recommendations_implemented_for_B))),
360h,8640h))
5.2.2 Own process control
OPC component contains characteristics and attitudes of the agent, which do not
change or change very slowly over time, in particular personal traits and capabilities.
These characteristics play a role in the cognitive processing of the agent. For the case
study the ranges of the uniformly distributed cultural indexes for air traffic controller
agents from ANSP3 are defined in OPC based on the indexes for a Western European
culture provided in Hofstede (2005): IDV: [0.7,0.9]; PDI: [0.3,0.5]; UAI: [0.4,0.6].
Furthermore, for the controller agents from ANSP3 the priority values of needs pro-
vided in Table 3 are assumed. The values were determined based on the cultural
classification framework from Hofstede (2005); each value is from [0,1]. According
to Locke (2001) and van de Walle (1997) the behavior of a human is goal-directed
and is steered by his or her needs. Thus, needs exert a significant influence on the
cognitive dynamics of a human, in particular on decision making.
Table 3 The minimal acceptable satisfaction values of needs and the ranges of the uniformly distributed
basic valences of needs of controller agents from the ANSP3 used in the simulation
Need Minimum acceptable
satisfaction level
1. Extrinsic needs 1
2. Own group approval 0.6
3. Management approval 0.5
4. Contribution to organizational safety-related goals 0.7
5. Self-esteem, self-confidence and self-actualization needs 0.9
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5.2.3 Cognitive state determination
Component Cognitive State Determination is responsible for the update of the agent’s
cognitive states used in its decision making. The complete specification of the agent’s
cognitive dynamics is provided in Appendix A (supplementary material). In this sec-
tion, the dynamics of the commitment to safety and maturity level considered in
Sect. 5.1 are described formally.
The dynamics of cognitive states is specified by causal networks. The relations in
the causal networks are formalized by temporal equations. Some of these equations
are instantaneous, whereas others are difference equations over two successive time
steps. In such a way one can specify mutual influences of states and loops in cognitive
processes of agents. In particular, based on the theoretical findings from Sect. 5.1 the
commitment value is calculated based on a feedback loop: the agent’s commitment
influences the team commitment, but also the commitment of the team members and
of the management influence the agent’s commitment:
e6a,t = w1 · e1t−1 + w2 · e2a,t−1 + w3 · e3a,G,t−1 + w4 · e4a,t−1 + w4 · e5a,t−1,
here e1t is the priority of safety-related goals in the controller’s role description, e2a,t
is the perception of the commitment to safety of management, e3a,G,t is the percep-
tion of the average commitment to safety of the team, e4a,t is the perceived influence
degree of controller a on safety arrangements, e5a,t is the controller’s maturity level
w.r.t. the task; w1-w4 are the weights.
The perception of agent a of the average commitment to safety of its team G at
time point t (e3a,G,t ) is based on the perception of commitment to safety of the team
supervisor s and of other team members and is calculated as:
e3a,G,t = w16 · e13a,t−1 + w17 · e41a,G,t−1
The perception of commitment to safety of the team supervisor s is determined by:
e13a,t = w14 · e14s,t−1 + w15 · e2a,t−1,
here e14s,t is the level of development of the managerial skills of the supervisor
of the agent’s team G (i.e., is_in_team(a,G) ∧ is_supervisor_of(s,G));e2a,t is the
perception of the commitment to safety of management.
The perception of commitment to safety of other team members in G is calculated
as:
e41a,G,t = i∈T e6i,t /|T|,
here T = {ag | is_in_team(a,G) AND ∃ag:AGENT is_in_team(ag, G) AND is_
supervisor_of(s, G) AND a = ag AND ag =s}, i.e., the set of all agents from G ex-
cept s and a; e6i,t−1 is the commitment of agent i at time point t-1; w14-w17 are
weights.
An agent evaluates the management’s commitment to safety by considering factors
that reflect the management’s effort in contribution to safety (investment in personnel
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and technical systems, training, safety arrangements):
e2a,t = w6 · e7t−1 + w7 · e8t−1 + w8 · e1t−1 + w9 · e9t−1 + w10 · e70G,t−1
+ w11 · e10t−1 + w12 · e11t−1 + w13 · e12t−1
here e7t is the sufficiency of the amount of safety investigators, e8t is the sufficiency
of the amount of controllers, e1t is the priority of safety-related goals in the con-
troller’s role description, e9t is the availability of up-to-date technical systems for
controllers, e10t is the sufficiency and timeliness of training for changes, e11t is the
regularity of safety meetings, e12t is the quality of developed and implemented safety
management system (SMS), e70G,t is the averaged perceived degree of influence of
the controllers on safety arrangements:
e70G,t =
∑
ag∈GR
e4ag,t /|GR|,
where GR = {g|is_in_team(g,G) AND is_in_team(a,G)}
here e4ag,t is the perceived influence degree of controller agent ag on safety arrange-
ments.
Based on the theoretical findings from Sect. 5.1, the maturity level of a controller
agent a at time point (e5a,t ) is calculated by a difference equation as:
e5a,t = w22 · e19a,t−1 + w23 · e20a,t−1 + w24 · e21a,t−1 + w25 · e23a,t−1
here e19a,t is the agent’s self-confidence w.r.t. the ATC task (depends on the number
of occurrences with the controller); e20a,t is the agent’s commitment to perform the
ATC task; e21a,t is the agent’s development level of skills for the ATC task; e23a,t−1
is the adequacy of the mental models for the air traffic control (ATC) tasks.
The adequacy of mental models of the agent for the ATC task (e23a,t ) is defined
as:
e23a,t = w26 · e10t + w27 · e22a,t
here e10t is the indicator for sufficiency and timeliness of training for changes. The
adequacy of knowledge about safety issues (e22a,t ) is defined by:
e22a,t = w28 ·
∑
si∈S1
si/|S1| + w29 ·
∑
si∈S2
si/|S2|,
where S1 = {q1| has_state(a, belief(final_report(occurrence(o, cl, ag1), q1))) holds at
t}; ∑ si /|S1| is the average quality of the final occurrence assessment reports received
by the agent up to the time point t; S2 = {q2| has_state(a, belief(monthly_report(m,
q2))) holds at t}, ∑ si /|S2| is the average quality of the monthly safety overview
reports received by the agent up to the time point t, w22-w29 are the weights. All
evidence (e) variables vary in the range [0,1].
The completeness and correctness of knowledge of a controller agent are deter-
mined to a great extent by the quality of reports obtained by the agent. The model
98 A. Sharpanskykh, S.H. Stroeve
includes factors that influence the quality of a notification report for an observed
occurrence, such as the maturity level w.r.t. the ATC task, the quality of technical
systems and the acceptability of the workload. The quality of the notification report
influences the quality of the occurrence investigation.
The quality of a notification report is influenced by the quality of perception and
comprehension of a situation by a controller in the context of execution of an air
traffic control task. The perception and comprehension of a controller are dependent
on:
• The quality of technical systems (e17t ), which ensures (timely) provision of the
required data and minimal distortion of these data:
e17t = w30 · e25t + w31 · e26t + w32 · e9t
here e25t is sufficiency of the amount of maintenance personnel, which is depen-
dent on the number of technical systems that need to be maintained and on the
degree of exploitation of these systems by controllers, e26t is the quality of formal
procedures for system checks and repairs depending on the clarity of identification
of role responsibilities, on the frequency of system checks and on scheduling and
timely performance of system repairs, and e9t is the availability of reliable and
ergonomic technical systems for controllers required for the effective and efficient
execution of air traffic control tasks.
• Acceptability of the workload level (e18G,t ): it is assumed that quality of per-
ception and comprehension of a controller degrades when his/her workload level
increases above some threshold:
e18G,t = w39 · e8t + w40 · e14a,t ,
here a denotes the supervisor of team G, i.e., is_supervisor_of(a, G), e8t is the
sufficiency of the number of controllers, evaluated by determining if the number
of controllers in each sector is sufficient to handle the traffic in the sector; e14a,t is
the level of development of managerial skills of the supervisor. (Highly) developed
management skills of the supervisor contribute to a work distribution under which
each team member has an acceptable for him/her workload level.
• Information contribution provided by other agents (e16o,ot,a,t ). Other agents may
also provide useful information to a controller, which may enhance his/her com-
prehension of a situation in the context of an air traffic control task. Among these
agents are controller(s) assigned to the same sector, controllers of the adjacent
sectors, and the team supervisor. To provide information useful for the occur-
rence recognition, the controller-information provider should possess knowledge
relevant to the occurrence (e.g., knowledge about similar observed occurrences).
The more knowledge related to the occurrence the controller possesses, the higher
the effect of his/her information contribution. In this model it is assumed that
the knowledge about three or more similar occurrences is the maximal amount
of knowledge. This number was determined roughly based on the frequencies of
occurrences of different types in ANSP3. Furthermore, the motivation to provide
this knowledge depends on the commitment of the controller to safety. Similarly,
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the information contribution by the team supervisor depends on the amount of
knowledge about safety-related issues, and on his/her commitment to safety.
e16o,ot,a,t = w33 · (w34 · e6a,t + w35 · e27o,ot,a,t )
+ w36 · (w37 · e28o,ot,a,t + w38 · e13a,t )
here e6a,t is the commitment to safety of controller agent a, e13a,t is the a’s
perception of the commitment to safety of the team supervisor, e27o,ot,a,t is the
amount of knowledge on similar safety-related issues of a controller:
e27o,ot,a,t = 0, when max
ag∈H |Sag| = 0;
e27o,ot,a,t = 1, when max
ag∈H |Sag| > sufficient_similar_occur;
e27o,ot,a,t = 1/ max
ag∈H |Sag|, when max |Sag| > 0 and
max |Sag| ≤ sufficient_similar_occur
where H = {a | is_in_team(ag, gr) & is_in_team(a, gr) & a =ag holds at t}, Sa =
{has_state(a, belief(occurrence(o1, ot, a1)))};
e28o,ot,a,t is the amount of knowledge on similar safety-related issues of the
supervisor:
e28o,ot,ag,t = 0, when |S| = 0;
e28o,ot,ag,t = 1/|S|, when |S| > 0 and |S| ≤ sufficient_similar_occur;
e28o,ot,ag,t = 1, when |S| > sufficient_similar_occur;
where S = {has_state(a, belief(occurrence(o1, ot, a1))) | is_in_team(ag, gr) &
is_supervisor_of(a, gr) }
• Maturity level w.r.t. ATC task (e5a,t ).
Thus, the quality of a notification report produced by agent a for an occurrence o
of type ot is calculated as:
e15o,ot,a,t = w18 · e16o,ot,a,t + w19 · e5a,t + w20 · e17t + w21 · e18G,t
For calculating the quality of other types of reports we refer to the Appendix A
(supplementary material).
5.2.4 Decision making
The agent’s decision making considers the evaluation of the forces for two alter-
natives: to report and to not report. A decision making model for reporting an oc-
currence is provided in Fig. 7. The agent chooses to perform the alternative with a
greater force. In the following the basis for calculation of the variables of the deci-
sion making model for reporting is discussed. The precise, elaborated details of the
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Fig. 7 Decision making model for reporting an occurrence
mathematical model for both reporting and not reporting can be found in Appendix A
(supplementary material).
The factors E{1,5}, E{1,2}, I {1,5,1} and I {1,2,1} are defined based on the
ANSP’s formal reprimand/reward policies. In particular, E{1,2} = 1 for an observed
occurrence, which completes a set of occurrences, for which a reprimand is defined;
E{1,2} = 0 for all other observed occurrences. The values of E{1,3} and I {1,3,2}
depend largely on the average commitment of the team of controllers to safety, and
E{1,8} and I {1,4,3} depend on the management commitment to safety. In particu-
lar:
E{1,3}a,t = (1 − e66a,t ) · (dw1 · e57G,t + (1 − dw1) · e3a,G,t )
where G is such that is_in_team(a, G) holds, e3a,G,t is the perception of agent a
of the average commitment to safety of its team G, e66a,t is the agent’s perception
of confidentiality of reporting, e57G,t is the perception of the positive attitude to
reporting in team G:
e57G,t =
∑
si∈S1
si/|S1|,
where S1 = {v | has_state(ag, belief(force(report(o, cl), v), t)) & is_in_team(ag, G)}.
Agents learn by observing the behavior of other agents. In the case study a controller
agent observes occurrence reporting of other agents from his/her shift, and based on
that forms the beliefs about the shift’s averaged attitude to reporting of different types
of occurrences (e57G,t ).
With each set of occurrences, in which a controller agent was involved during an
evaluation period (e.g., a month), a measure of severity is associated, calculated as the
sum of the severities of the occurrences from the set. The factors E{1,7}, E{1,8},
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I {1,7,2}, I {1,4,3} depend mostly on the severity of the set of occurrences of the
controller known to his/her team and known to the management. In particular,
E{1,7}a,t = (1 − e66a,t ) · (e65a,t · e61a + (1 − e35G,t ) · (1 − e61a))
I {1,7,2}a,t = dw8 · (e65a,t · e61a + (1 − e35G,t ) · (1 − e61a)),
here agent a is in team G, e66a,t is the agent’s perception of confidentiality of re-
porting, e65a,t is the total severity of a set of occurrences of the controller occurred
during the evaluation time interval, which are known to the team of the controller,
e61a is the individualism index (IDV) value of the controller agent; e35G,t is the
intensity of informal interaction in the team of controllers.
To calculate the intensity of informal interaction in a team G of controllers
(e35G,t ) according to the Burt’s social contagion theory introduced in Sect. 5.1,
a measure of degree of acquaintance (acq) of agents ag1 and ag2 worked n shifts
together is introduced, calculated as follows:
if n = 0 and t is the current time point, then acq(ag1,ag2, t) = 0;
else if acq_shifts > n > 0 and t is the current time point, then acq(ag1, ag2, t) =
e35max/n
else if n ≥ acq_shifts and t is the current time point, then acq(ag1, ag2, t) = e35max,
where e35max is the maximum intensity of informal interactions in the team of con-
trollers.
Then, e35G,t = ∑acq(ag1, ag2, t) /(|G| · (|G| − 1)).
Informal interaction relations enhance the knowledge of controllers about safety
issues and observed occurrences, and may contribute to the proactive identification
of issues by the controllers. The degree of contribution of informal discussions of
controllers in a team G to the quality of input for proactive identification of issues by
the controllers is specified by:
e34G,t = w49 ·
∑
a∈{ag|is_in_team(ag,G)}
e3a,G,t /|G| + w51 ·
∑
si∈S1
si/|S1|
+ w52 ·
∑
si∈S2
si/|S2| + w50 · e35G,t
where S1 = {q | ∃t1 has_state(a, belief(notification_report_for(occurrence(o, cl, a1),
q), t1)) holds },
S2 = {q | ∃t2 has_state(a, belief(monthly_report(m, q), t2)) & is_supervisor_of(a,
G) holds }
e3a,G,t is the perception of agent a of the average commitment to safety of its
team G.
E{1,6} is based on the agent’s beliefs about the dependencies between previous
reporting of similar occurrences and improvement of safety that followed:
E{1,6}o,cl,a,t = dw3 · e39o,cl,t + dw4 · e59cl,a,t + dw5 · e2ag,t
+ (1 − dw3 − dw4 − dw5) · e43a,t
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Here e39o,cl,t is the severity of the occurrence o; e2ag,t is the perception of the com-
mitment to safety of management; e59cl,a,t is the average quality of the final safety
occurrence assessment reports for occurrences similar to the observed occurrence
provided to controller agent a:
e59cl,a,t =
∑
si∈S1
si/|S1|,
where S1 = { v | has_state(a, belief(final_report(occurrence(o, cl, a), v), t)) } e43a,t is
the average quality of the monthly safety overview reports received by the agent:
e43a,t =
∑
si∈S1
si/|S1|,
where S1 = { v | has_state(a, belief(monthly_report(m, v), t)) }
I {1,3,5} and I {1,7,5} are based on the agent’s IDV index, which indicates the
degree of importance of team’s opinions for the agent.
I {1,4,5} and I {1,8,5} are based on the agent’s PDI index. In particular,
I {1,8,5}a,t = dw12 · e62a · e60a,t
where e62a is the power distance index (PDI) value of controller agent a, e60a,t is the
total severity of a set of occurrences of the controller occurred during the evaluation
time interval, which are known to the management.
Furthermore, also the values of the basis valences (the degrees of importance of
particular needs taken alone, see Fig. 7) of a controller agent depend on its indexes:
v{1}ba = 1 v{2}ba = 1 − e61a
v{3}ba = 0.7 · e62a + 0.3 · e64a v{4}ba = 0.3 + 0.7 · e64a
e61a is the value of individualism (IDV) index of controller a, e62a is the power
distance index (PDI) value of controller agent a, e64a is the uncertainty avoidance
index (UAI) value of controller agent a.
The values of valences change over time depending on the degree of satisfaction
of the agent’s needs: the more a need is satisfied, the less its valence:
v{need}a,t =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
v{need}ba · sat_acceptneed,asatneed,a,t , satneed,a,t ≥ sat_acceptneed,a
v{need}ba + v{need}ba · sat_acceptneed,a−satneed,a,tsat_acceptneed,a ,
satneed,a,t < sat_acceptneed,a
here sat_acceptneed,a is defined in Table 3, satneed,a,t is the current satisfaction value
of a need.
Individual learning influences expectancies and instrumentalities of the decision
making models of a controller agent significantly. In particular, the agent’s expectan-
cies E{1,5}, E{1,2} and E{2,6} change depending on the received (observed) rep-
rimands and rewards for occurrences reported by the agent (or by another agent from
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the shift) (instrumentalist (social) learning). E{1,3} and E{2,2} are adjusted by the
agent based on the observed shift’s averaged attitude to reporting of different types
of occurrences (social learning). E{1,6} and E{2,5} are adjusted based on the feed-
backs from the safety investigator agent on the previously reported occurrences and
the observed implementation of safety recommendations for previous reports (instru-
mentalist learning), and safety information informally provided by other controllers
during breaks (social learning).
5.3 Organizational learning
In the context of organizations a number of studies have been performed, which inves-
tigated the link between individual and organizational learning (Meinolf et al. 2001),
viewed in particular from the adaptation and knowledge perspectives.
From the adaptation perspective organizational learning is defined as the process
of organizational adaptation to internal/external changes based on individual learn-
ing. Within this perspective the model of organizational learning by March and Olsen
(1975) (see Fig. 8) gained much attention. In this model an individual action is based
on certain individual beliefs. This action, in turn, may lead to an organizational action,
which may produce some environmental response. The learning cycle is completed
when the environmental response affects individual beliefs. In such a way an individ-
ual learns through instrumentalist learning by observing the effects of own actions. In
such a way beliefs about (causal) relations between states can be created. For exam-
ple, if an agent receives a reprimand resulted from its reporting of an occurrence of
some type, then it will create a belief about a relation between these two states (i.e.,
‘reporting an occurrence of the type’ and ‘getting reprimand’). This belief will influ-
ence decision making of the agent on whether to report occurrences of the same type
in the future. The learning process may be made more subtle by assigning degrees of
confidence to the beliefs, as proposed in Sharpanskykh (2009).
The model also addresses the issue of incomplete learning cycles, when learning
is impaired because of the weakening or breakage of one or more links. For exam-
ple, link 3 in Fig. 8 is broken, when the individual affects organizational action in
an ambiguous way; link 4 is broken when no real basis for the connection between
organizational action and environmental response can be identified.
Many studies (e.g., Meinolf et al. 2001) have shown that information about incom-
plete learning cycles is also remembered by individuals and used in their decision
making, thus influencing the organizational learning. In such a way organizational
learning does not always lead to the organizational improvement. To capture such
effects, the March and Olsen’s model is extended in this paper as shown in Fig. 8
Fig. 8 Model of organizational
learning adapted from March
and Olsen (1975) with the
modifications indicated by
dotted lines
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by dotted lines. Also, the individual decision making process, implicit in the original
model, is made explicit.
From the knowledge perspective organizational learning is defined as accumula-
tion of organizational knowledge. From this perspective a significant part of the orga-
nizational knowledge is captured in the organizational routines (e.g., procedures, reg-
ulations, guidelines). Furthermore, much of not formalized organizational knowledge
can be learned through informal social interaction within the organization (individual
social learning).
An interaction between the adaptation and knowledge perspectives can be estab-
lished through individual beliefs. More specifically, an individual forms beliefs about
formally and informally provided organizational knowledge. A relevant subset of
these beliefs can be used further in the individual decision making about the action
choice as shown in Fig. 8.
In the model considered organizational learning leads to safety improvement,
when controller agents choose to report occurrences. In this case from the knowledge
perspective organizational learning leads to the accumulation of information about
observed safety occurrences. From the adaptation perspective, safety improvement is
supported by complete learning cycles.
5.4 Safety culture modeling
Based on the cognitive and behavioral states described in the previous sections pre-
cise expressions for the safety culture indicators identified in Sect. 3.1 have been
determined.
SCI1: Average reporting quality of controllers This indicator is determined based
on the decisions of controller agents whether to report observed occurrences:
SCI1 =
∑
a∈CONTROLLER,ot∈OCC_TYPE
not,a/(|CONTROLLER| · |OCC_TYPE| · mot,a),
where not,a is the number of occurrences of type ot observed and reported by an
agent controller a during the simulation; mot,a is the number of occurrences of type
ot observed by an agent controller a during the simulation; CONTROLLER is the
set of all names of the controller agents; OCC_TYPE is the set of all names of the
occurrence types.
SCI2: Average quality of the processed notification reports
SCI2 =
∑
a∈CONTROLLER,t∈TIME,ot∈OCC_TYPE,o∈OCCUR
e15o,ot,a,t /|OCCUR|,
where e15o,ot,a,t is the quality of the notification report for an occurrence o of type ot
reported by an agent a at time point t; OCCUR is the set of names of all occurrences.
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SCI3: Average quality of the final safety occurrence assessment reports
SCI3 =
∑
S/|S|,
where S = {v | ∃a:CONTROLLER,o:OCCUR, cl:OCC_TYPE, t:TIMEhas_state
(a,belief(final_report(occurrence(o, cl, a), v), t))}
SCI4: Average quality of the monthly safety overview reports received by controllers
SCI4 =
∑
S/|S|,
where S = {v | ∃a:CONTROLLER,m:MONTH, t:TIMEhas_state(a,belief(monthly_
report(m, v), t))}
SCI5.1: Average commitment to safety of controllers
SCI5.1 =
∑
a∈CONTROLLER,t∈TIME
e6a,t /(|CONTROLLER| · |TIME|),
here e6a,t is the commitment to safety of an agent a at time point t; CONTROLLER
is the set of all names of controller agents, and TIME is the set of all time points.
SCI5.2: Average commitment to safety of a team as perceived by controllers
SCI5.2 =
∑
a∈CONTROLLER,t∈TIME,G∈TEAM
e3a,G,t /(|CONTROLLER| · |TEAM| · |TIME|),
here e3a,G,t is the perception of the average commitment to safety of the team G at
time point t, CONTROLLER is the set of all names of the controller agents, TEAM is
the set of all team names, TIME is the set of all time points.
SCI6: Average commitment to safety of a supervisor as perceived by controllers
SCI6 =
∑
a∈CONTROLLER,t∈TIME
e13a,t /(|CONTROLLER| · |TIME|),
here e13a,t is the perception of commitment to safety of the team supervisor of the
team of agent a; CONTROLLER is the set of all names of the controller agents, TIME
is the set of all time points.
SCI7: Average commitment to safety of management as perceived by controllers
SCI7 =
∑
a∈CONTROLLER,t∈TIME
e2a,t /(|CONTROLLER| · |TIME|),
here e2a,t is the perception of the commitment to safety of management of agent a at
time point t, CONTROLLER is the set of all names of the controller agents, TIME is
the set of all time points.
106 A. Sharpanskykh, S.H. Stroeve
6 Model results
First, simulation results obtained based on the developed model are discussed in
Sect. 6.1 These results reflect the estimated quality of the organizational safety cul-
ture. Next, a sensitivity analysis approach to identify main sources of deficiencies in
the safety culture is proposed in Sect. 6.2. Moreover, it is demonstrated how results of
such analysis can be used for structured identification of safety culture improvement
options. Model validation results are considered in Sect. 6.3.
6.1 Simulation
Based on the developed model 3000 simulation trials were performed in the Matlab
environment, where each trial represents three years of operations. The probabilities
of different types of occurrences used in the simulation are specified based on the
Annual Safety Report 2007 of ANSP-3.
To perform simulation the model has been initialized based on the obtained infor-
mation about the organization by assigning values to:
• independent inputs of the causal networks in the model (the complete list is pro-
vided in Appendix A, supplementary material). These variables were evaluated
using part of the results of the safety culture survey questionnaire of ANSP-3, as
detailed in supplementary material. In particular the questions used to determine
the values of the input variables were separated from the questions to determine
the reference results of the safety culture indicators in the model validation phase
(Sect. 6.3);
• weights, which reflect relative contribution of states in aggregations for other states
in the causal networks (the model contains 60 weights);
• task durations, which refer to the (limits of) task durations in workflows, the model
contains upper and lower bounds for 16 tasks;
• decision making parameters, which are related to the decision making models from
Sect. 5.2 (28 parameters);
• other (55 parameters).
The model contains a number of stochastic processes, which represent the random-
ness in the happening of the four types of occurrences, the identification not reported
occurrences by a team of controllers, the identification of not reported occurrences
by the management, the feedback provision to a controller for a reported occurrence,
and the duration of task processing. Details of these intrinsic stochastic processes are
in Appendix A (supplementary material).
For the complete set input variables and parameters used in the simulation we refer
to Appendix A (supplementary material).
The obtained means and variances of the safety culture indicators are provided
in Table 4. It can be observed that the variances are very small, which indicate that
the randomness due to the intrinsic stochastic processes has almost no effect on the
safety culture indicators.
The results in Table 4 are the model predictions of the safety culture indicators
given the fixed estimates of the input variables. To assess the effect of variation in the
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Table 4 Simulation results for the safety culture indicators of ANSP-3, based on 3000 simulation trials
of three years of operation each
SCI Description Mean Variance
SCI1 Average reporting quality of controllers 0.74 5e−3
SCI2 Average quality of the processed notification reports 0.54 4e−4
SCI3 Average quality of the final safety occurrence assessment reports 0.2 7e−3
SCI4 Average quality of the monthly safety overview reports received
by controllers
0.58 6e−5
SCI5.1 Average commitment to safety of controllers 0.56 2e−3
SCI5.2 Average commitment to safety of a team as perceived by
controllers
0.55 1e−3
SCI6 Average commitment to safety of a supervisor as perceived by
controllers
0.6 8e−4
SCI7 Average commitment to safety of management as perceived by
controllers
0.61 4e−5
Fig. 9 Examples of distributions of safety culture indicators (Monte Carlo simulation results); all input
variables were varied over their full range, except the national culture variables which were associated
with the Western European culture; the vertical axis is the number of simulation runs
input variables, we performed additional Monte Carlo simulations in which all input
variables were varied over their full range, except the national culture variables which
were associated with the Western European culture. Figure 9 provides examples of
histograms for the Monte Carlo simulations results for two safety culture indicators
(1000 simulation trials each). As indicated by these typical results in Fig. 9, the vari-
ance of the safety culture indicators due to the variation in model inputs is much
higher than the variance due to the intrinsic stochastic processes shown in Table 4.
A more detailed analysis of the sensitivity of the safety culture indicators for the input
variables is provided next in Sect. 6.2.
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6.2 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis can be used to identify the most influential organizational factors
for each safety culture indicator. Values of these factors determine to a large extent
the safety culture indicator value. Thus, the cause of a deficiency in the value of an
indicator can be attributed to the corresponding organizational factors. The sensitivity
analysis method used in this study is Monte Carlo filtering (Saltelli et al. 2008). The
aim of Monte Carlo filtering is to identify the model parameters of which the variation
according to associated credibility intervals lead to significant differences in attained
model output classes. It consists of two steps, which are presented next.
Step 1: MC simulations For the complete set of model parameters, lower and upper
bounds of credibility intervals of their values were determined based on our knowl-
edge of the ANSP3 organization and on our knowledge about the uncertainty in
modeled aspects. Next, 8000 Monte Carlo simulation trials were performed where
in each simulation the parameters were chosen uniformly within their credibility in-
terval bounds. For each input factor xi two sets of values were determined: xi |B ,
containing all values of xi from the simulations that produced a High safety culture
indicator, and xi |B , containing all xi values that produced a Low or Medium safety
culture indicator.
Step 2: Smirnov test A Smirnov two sample test was performed for each input factor
independently. The applied test statistics are
d(xi) = sup
Y
‖FB(xi|B) − FB(xi |B)‖,
where FB and FB are marginal cumulative probability distribution functions calcu-
lated for the sets xi |B and xi |B , respectively, and where Y is the output. A low level
of d(xi) supports the null-hypothesis H0: FB(xi |B) = FB(xi |B), meaning that the
input factor xi is not important, whereas a high level of d(xi) implies the rejection of
H0 meaning that xi is a key factor.
It was determined at what significance level α, the value of d(xi) implies the
rejection of H0, where α is the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true. In the
sensitivity analysis, the classification High/Medium/Low for the importance of each
factor was used. If α ≤ 0.01, then the importance of the corresponding factor xi is
High; if 0.01 < α ≤ 0.1, then the importance of the corresponding factor is Medium,
and if α > 0.1, then the importance of the corresponding factor is Low.
In Table 5 some examples of the importance of input variables are given for each
safety culture indicator, according to above methodology.
To analyze the reproducibility of the sensitivity analysis results two similarity
measures were introduced for two sets of safety culture indicators S1 and S2 obtained
through sensitivity analysis by performing the same number of simulations twice;
a set S comprises indicators that belong to the class High (subset SH ) and indicators
that belong to the class Medium (subset SM ):
i(S1H ,S
2
H ) = |S1H ∩ S2H |/|S1H ∪ S2H | (similarly for S1M and S2M)
i(S1H ,S
1
M,S
2
H ,S
2
M) = |(S1H ∪ S1M) ∩ (S2H ∪ S2M)|/|(S1H ∪ S1M) ∪ (S2H ∪ S2M)|
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Table 5 Importance of some input variables classified by categories (H)igh/(M)edium/(L)ow for the
ANSP3’s safety culture indicators
Var Description SCI 1 SCI 2 SCI 3 SCI 4 SCI 5.1 SCI 5.2 SCI 6 SCI 7
e1 Priority of safety-related goals
in the role description
M M L M H H H H
e4 Influence of a controller on
safety activities
H L L L H H H H
e7 Sufficiency of the number of
safety investigators
M L H H H H H H
e10 Sufficiency and timeliness of
training for changes
L L L L H H H H
e12 Developed and implemented
SMS
M M L L H H H H
Table 6 Similarity indexes for
sets S1
H
, S2
H
, S1
M
, S2
M
for
different numbers of simulation
trials
Index Number of simulations
2000 4000 6000 8000
i(S1
H
,S2
H
) 0.81 0.88 0.96 1
i(S1
M
,S2
M
) 0.63 0.72 0.93 1
i(S1
H
,S1
M
,S2
H
,S2
M
) 0.83 0.86 0.97 1
The similarity indexes for the sets obtained by performing 2000, 4000, 6000 and
8000 simulation trials twice are provided in Table 6. As can be seen from the table,
by performing 8000 simulations stable results were obtained, i.e., the same set of the
safety culture indicators was obtained by the sensitivity analysis for both simulation
data samples. Thus, the sensitivity analysis results for ANSP3 provided in Table 7
obtained by performing 8000 simulations are reproducible.
A total safety culture sensitivity index is defined by firstly setting a value 0 for Low
sensitivity, a value 0.5 for Medium sensitivity and a value 1 for High sensitivity, and
subsequently summing those values over all safety culture indicators that need to be
improved for a particular variable. In Table 7 the safety culture sensitivity indexes for
the evidence input variables of the ANSP-3 model are provided. Input variables with
the total safety culture sensitivity indexes greater than or equal to 4 are considered
to be major organizational factors with the greatest influence upon the safety culture
indicators that require improvement.
For all other types of parameters in the model, the same sensitivity analysis was
performed. Overall, the importance of the other parameters for the total set of safety
culture indicators is much lower than the importance of the input variables. Only for
one weight, which describes the relation between the commitment of a supervisor to
safety and the perception of the commitment to safety in a team, a total safety culture
index of 4 is achieved. All other parameters are less important.
Based on the sensitivity analysis of the model for ANSP3, eight Major Organiza-
tional Factors (MOFs) with the greatest influence on the organizational safety culture
were identified:
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Table 7 Total safety culture sensitivity index for the evidence input variables of the ANSP-3 model. The
major organizational factors are highlighted in grey
Input evidence variable Total SC
sensitivity
index
e1 Priority of safety-related goals in the role description 5.5
e4 Influence of a controller on safety activities 5
e7 Sufficiency of the number of safety investigators 6.5
e8 Sufficiency of the number of controllers 8
e9 Availability of reliable and ergonomic technical systems for controllers 5.5
e10 Sufficiency and timeliness of training for changes 4
e11 Regularity of safety meetings 2.5
e12 Developed and implemented SMS 5
e14 Level of development of managerial skills 7
e19 Self-confidence for ATC task 3.5
e20 Commitment to perform ATC task 3
e21 Development level of skills for ATC task 1
e25 Sufficiency of the number of maintenance personnel 3.5
e26 Quality of formal procedures for system checks and repairs 0.5
e35 Intensity of informal interactions in the team of controllers 0
e36 Quality of the formal safety occurrence assessment procedure 0
e40 Quality of the communication channel between controllers and safety investigators 1
e44 Average commitment of the agents involved in the safety analysis 1.5
e61 Individualism index of a controller 0
e62 Power distance index of a controller 0
e63 Masculinity index of a controller 0
e64 Uncertainty avoidance index of a controller 0
e71 Formal support for confidentiality of reporting 0
MOF1: Sufficiency of the number of controllers
MOF2: Level of development of managerial skills of supervisors
MOF3: Sufficiency of the number of safety investigators
MOF4: Priority of safety-related goals in the role description
MOF5: Availability of reliable and ergonomic technical systems for controllers
MOF6: Influence of a controller on safety activities
MOF7: Developed and implemented Safety Management System (SMS)
MOF8: Sufficiency and timeliness of training for changes
Since MOFs exert a significant effect on the organizational safety culture, they can
serve as a good basis for identification of organizational improvement options. Based
on the MOFs identified for ANSP3, five organizational improvement options (OIOs)
were identified:
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OIO1: More involvement of controllers in safety assessment for development of new
systems and procedures (based on MOF4, 5, 6)
OIO2: Improve workload of controllers by developing explicit rules for balancing
safety and capacity in nominal and non-nominal conditions (based on MOF1, 4)
OIO3: Improve the quality of management by supervisors (based on MOF2)
OIO4: Improve coherence and communication in the safety management system
(based on MOF3, 7)
OIO5: Improve the communication about and training for changes (based on
MOF8)
6.3 Model validation
As a basis for the validation, results of the safety culture survey questionnaire for
ANSP3 and of the related workshops administered by the EUROCONTROL orga-
nization were used. The validation of the model results was performed in two ways
(see Fig. 10):
• The level of validity of the results was determined by the comparison of the model-
based results and the results of the safety culture survey questionnaire at ANSP3.
The questionnaire comprises a set of statements about potential enablers and dis-
ablers of safety culture in an ANSP. The questionnaire results include mean scores
for the level of agreement of employees of ANSP3 to the statements on a scale
from 1 (“fully disagree”) to 5 (“fully agree”).
• The degree of agreement was determined between major organizational factors
affecting safety culture indicators and related improvement options which were
inferred from a sensitivity analysis of the organizational model, and key issues and
related improvement options stemming from the safety culture survey workshop
results.
As a basis for the comparison of the obtained model results with the survey results,
we introduced three classes for the values of the model results and the survey results:
Low, Medium and High.
Fig. 10 Schematic representation of the validation process
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Table 8 The classified values of the safety culture indicators obtained from the model and the survey
questionnaire data
Safety culture indicator Model Survey
SCI1: Average reporting quality of controllers Medium Medium
SCI2: Average quality of the processed notification reports High –
SCI3: Average quality of the final safety occurrence assessment reports Medium Medium
SCI4: Average quality of the monthly safety overview reports received
by controllers
Medium Medium
SCI5.1: Average commitment to safety of controllers Medium Medium
SCI5.2: Average commitment to safety of a team as perceived by con-
trollers
Medium Medium
SCI6: Average commitment to safety of a supervisor as perceived by
controllers
Medium Low
SCI7: Average commitment to safety of management as perceived by
controllers
Medium Medium
The model results were mapped to these classes using the Monte Carlo simulations
results for full variation of the input variables as presented in Sect. 6.1 and Fig. 9.
In particular for each safety culture indicator, the ranges of the class Low followed
from the lowest 30% of its values, the ranges of the class Medium followed from the
subsequent 55% of the values and the ranges of the class High followed from the
highest 15% of the values.
A definition of the class ranges of the survey results had been done before we
received the questionnaire results of ANSP-3, on the basis of survey questionnaire
results of another (independent) ANSP-2. We analyzed the distribution of these sur-
vey results and we chose the class ranges such to achieve a distribution equal to the
distribution used for the model results, i.e. Low for the lowest 30%, Medium followed
from the subsequent 55% and High for the highest 15%.
Using these mappings, the model results (Table 4) and questionnaire results were
classified as shown in Table 8. More details on this validation can be accessed in the
companion paper (Stroeve et al. 2011).
The comparison of the class labels for the model- and survey-based safety culture
indicator values shows that the results are consistent for six out of seven indicators.
Only the result for indicator I6 is lower in the survey than in the model. The indicator
I2.1 was not relevant for the survey study.
To determine the degree of agreement between major organizational factors affect-
ing safety culture indicators and related improvement options, results of the safety
culture workshop, which was held by EUROCONTROL personnel at ANSP3, were
used. The purpose of this workshop was to perform a deeper investigation of the is-
sues identified by the safety culture questionnaire at ANSP3 by conducting interviews
with ANSP3’s employees. The model results were obtained without any knowledge
about the workshop results. The model and workshop results were compared with the
assistance of the workshop organizers by identifying for each Major Organizational
Factor from the model (from Sect. 6.2) the range of related results of the safety cul-
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ture workshop. In such a way, a conclusion about the agreement between the results
of the model and the workshop was reached.
It was concluded that from the eight model-based Major Organizational Factors
there is some agreement for two factors (MOF1, 4) and good agreement for the re-
maining six factors (MOF2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). Also, the model-based improvement options
(from Sect. 6.2) were evaluated. Together with the workshop organizers it was con-
cluded that the model-based recommendations are consistent with the recommenda-
tions of the survey study. The latter recommendations tend to reflect the larger detail
in the organizational context as has emerged in the workshop at ANSP3. In addi-
tion to the list of consistent recommendations, the survey study identified a number
of recommendations that are not or only partly addressed in the model-based study.
Recommendations that were not addressed reflect aspects that are out of the scope
of the model, e.g. on-the-job-training or learning processes of the Engineering de-
partment. Recommendations that were only partly addressed mostly reflect aspects
for which the organizational context is known in more detail via the workshops at
ANSP3.
7 Conclusions
In this paper a new, agent-based approach for structured analysis and improvement
of organizational safety culture is proposed. Agent-based modeling and analysis have
been used previously to study the efficiency or safety of air traffic scenarios (e.g.
Wolfe 2007; Tumer and Agogino 2007; Blom et al. 2006), however agent-based mod-
eling at the organizational level to study safety culture is a new subject both in air
traffic management and in the area of multi-agent systems.
The main added value of the proposed approach is that it defines explicit formal re-
lations between safety culture indicators and organizational processes and structures,
thus enabling identification of important organizational aspects impacting safety cul-
ture by sensitivity analysis techniques.
The agent-based organizational model for ANSP3 was designed using a struc-
tured methodology. The model of the formal organization was developed based on
the framework from Sharpanskykh (2008). The specification of agents and their be-
havior were defined based on the identified modeling requirements, on a number of
theories from social science and psychology, and on empirical basis from air traffic.
The agent architecture proposed provides more extensive tools for modeling cognitive
processes of different types than the agent architectures and frameworks based on tra-
ditional modeling paradigms (such as BDI (Bordini et al. 2009)). In contrast with the
activity-based architectures (such as Brahms (Sierhuis et al. 2007)) agent reasoning
is performed based not only on beliefs and world facts, but also using other internal
states such as goals, needs, commitments, personal traits. Moreover, the reasoning
models described in the paper represent formalized theories from psychological and
sociological literature and are not limited to deduction procedures from formal log-
ics. As has been demonstrated in Byrne and Kirlik (2005), the cognitive architecture
ACT-R, which constitutes a unified theory of cognition, can be used for modeling low
level operations of air traffic controllers. However, ACT-R is less suitable for spec-
ification of processes of the social level and of aggregated organizational concepts
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and processes, which are of importance for our study. As a result many of the safety
culture indicators from the study cannot be related to ACT-R modeling concepts. Fur-
thermore, ACT-R models do not scale well, which would constitute a computational
problem for our study.
Every modeling step was based on empirical data (formal documents, interviews,
questionnaire results) provided by EUROCONTROL and ANSP3. In such a way the
correctness of many assumptions underlying the model of ANSP3 was ensured as
much as possible.
The validation of the model results was performed in two ways. The comparison
of the model-based safety culture indicators with the survey-based safety culture is-
sues showed that mostly valid model results have been obtained. Next it was found
that, the model results obtained based on the sensitivity analysis are mostly consis-
tent with the results of the safety culture survey workshop. Both the model and the
workshop used outcomes of the survey questionnaire as input, but the processes for
achieving their results were completely different and independent. As such, the con-
sistency in both validation phases is a good indication of the model’s validity. The
validity of the model results depends greatly on the validity of the estimation of the
model inputs. Our experience shows that the formal organizational documentation
and interviews provide a limited basis for such estimation. The highest validity level
of the estimation was achieved with the use of anonymous survey data from ANSP3,
different from the ones used for the model analysis and validation.
The limitation in the detail of the organizational context and the scope of the model
in comparison with the survey-based results, on the one hand, a fundamental model-
ing issue, in the sense that a model is always an abstraction of reality. On the other
hand, the range of organizational aspects that are considered in detail in the model
may be enhanced. In the current study, the model development was focused on the
occurrence reporting cycle and other processes such as management actions, engi-
neering activities and traffic management actions by controllers were modeled at a
high (abstract) level.
Safety culture professionals from EUROCONTROL recognized a high potential
of the proposed approach. In particular, the approach may further enhance safety
culture questionnaires and be used to prepare safety culture survey workshops. In the
future the approach may be applied for safety culture analysis of ANSPs from other
national cultures.
Furthermore, another promising direction for future research is to integrate the de-
veloped approach into existing agent-based approaches such as Tumer and Agogino
(2007) and Blom et al. (2006), which address systems at the operational level and do
not consider the organizational and cultural contexts. In such a way explicit reciprocal
relations between organizational structures, processes and safety culture on the one
side and operational safety indicators (e.g., risks) on the other side can be defined.
The identification of such relations enables understanding and profound analysis of
the system behavior at different aggregation levels (e.g., individual, team, organiza-
tion).
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